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Abstract
We compare price dynamics of diﬀerent market protocols (batch
auction, continuous double auction and dealership) in an agent-based
artiﬁcial exchange. In order to distinguish the eﬀects of market archi-
tectures alone, we use a controlled environment where allocative and
informational issues are neglected and agents do not optimize or learn.
Hence, we rule out the possibility that the behaviour of traders drives
the price dynamics. Aiming to compare price stability and execution
quality in broad sense, we analyze standard deviation, excess kurtosis,
tail exponent of returns, volume, perceived gain by traders and bid-ask
spread. Overall, a dealership market appears to be the best candidate
in this respect, generating low volume and volatility, virtually no excess
kurtosis and high perceived gain.
1 Introduction
The observation that stock exchanges are run under a diverse set of market
architectures and protocols raises some obvious and yet intriguing ques-
tions. If we do not content ourself with the explanation that this is due
to historic accidents or mere temporal and casual path-dependence, then
we could investigate reasons explaining why exchanges developed so diﬀer-
ently and which are the main diﬀerences in the dynamic properties of the
prevailing price or return time-series.
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1We propose a terse model where allocative and informational eﬀects are
ruled out in order to be able to ascertain what is causing what, focusing
on the price dynamics statistics. The use of agent-based methodology is
particularly suited to control for unwanted side-eﬀects that can otherwise
blur the results. We develop an artiﬁcial market where simple agents trade a
risky asset using diﬀerent market protocols. As they receive no information,
have no learning capability and act in a strictly controlled framework1, we
hope to ascribe unambiguously the eﬀects on price dynamics to the market
protocol, which fundamentally is a blind mechanism to translate the demand
of traders into actual orders and transactions. Even in the absence of price-
discovery considerations or allocative eﬃciency remarks, this attribution
might be of great interest to regulatory agencies or other policy makers in
charge to devise and enforce trading rules.
Some important measures of execution quality and price stability can
be investigated in this framework, as suggested in [Madhavan, 2000] and
[Audet et al., 2001]: execution quality can be assessed by quantiﬁcation of
volume, bid-ask spread, liquidity, volatility, fatness of tails of returns dis-
tribution, kurtosis, market depth to mention some. Quite often, to borrow
Madhavan’s words, we would expect from a market some key functions,
namely good “provision of liquidity, continuity and price stabilization”. Al-
though the overall execution quality of a market is a multidimensional con-
cept, “price stability” in broad sense encompasses a wide set of previously
mentioned measures and is quite often a targeted objective of regulators. Ex-
cess volatility, kurtosis and tail exponents can be related to relevant ﬁnancial
shocks and to the emergence of bubbles in equity price. The burst of a price
bubbles can adversely aﬀect the economy and is sometimes deemed respon-
sible of a recession, see [Bernanke and Gertler, 1999]. Institutions should be
concerned about price volatility to limit ﬁnancial fragility of banks and insur-
ance ﬁrms whose risk exposure is dependent on price level and volatility, see
[Vila, 2000]. Broad stability of markets could also enhance price-discovery
and news interpretation as signals can be perceived more easily when the
background noise (i.e. the volatility intrinsically generated by the trading
protocol) is low.
Diﬀerent markets could serve to provide diﬀerent performances with re-
gard to the previously referenced criteria but a comprehensive comparison
of diﬀerent market protocols is, to the best of our knowledge, still lacking
in the literature. There are obvious diﬃculties in comparing markets or in-
stitutions in that it’s virtually impossible to “repeat” the experiment under
diﬀerent circumstances, as it is often the case in social sciences. If a sequence
of trades tooks place in some market at some time because of some order
1This setting is suited to describe a calm period in the market, with little informational
and liquidity ﬂows and no tensions to be resolved (mergings, IPOs...). Hence the results
that we discuss in the sequel might be diﬀerent from the ones generated in the presence
of events like, say, September 11th.
2ﬂow, there is no hope to rewind the ﬁlm changing the market protocol to see
how diﬀerent the outcomes would had been. Clever ideas have been used
to overcome these design problems, see [Amihud and Mendelson, 1987] and
[Amihud and Mendelson, 1991], using real exchanges data but some of their
conclusions can be questioned in several ways.
The eﬀects of one speciﬁc market protocol are rather indirectly inferred
in [Maslov, 2000] and [LiCalzi and Pellizzari, 2003] where simple agents (no
information ﬂows, adaptation or herding) interact in a Continuous Double
Auction (CDA). Though there is no comparison among diﬀerent markets,
their argument is the following: the behavioral characteristics of the agents
are so simple and innocuous that the resulting returns properties can chieﬂy
be attributed to the mechanism that forms the price. While, there is an ap-
preciable eﬀort to stress the notion that dynamics features of the price time-
series could be related to institutional devices rather than to the behaviour of
agents, as is most often done in the literature (see [Day and Huang, 1900] or
[Lux and Marchesi, 1999] 2), it is clear that their tentative conclusion needs
much corroboration. In [LiCalzi and Pellizzari, 2005] diﬀerent protocols are
compared in their ability to converge to the unique allocative equilibrium.
A good deal of experimental economics papers (see [Smith, 1988]) have
faced the comparison of market protocols directly running real experiments
with human subjects. These works often study small scale markets, that
can be reproduced in vitro more easily and with reasonable costs. Being
the result of real experiments, this body of work is largely immune to the
previous mentioned “repeatability” criticisms. Some of the results might be
not easily generalized to large-scale ﬁnancial markets but we feel that other
drawbacks could be pointed out. As noted elsewhere, experiments with real
subjects might be subtly aﬀected by the skill of the agents, the way in which
they have been instructed or their understanding of the problem. Addition-
ally and more importantly for our purposes, many experiments show that
the agents learn quite rapidly and naturally to more and more eﬀectively
cope with their task. Again, the reported results might not be imputed to
the market mechanism alone if agents are adapting and learning in time.
These considerations should increase the appeal of running computational
experiments to sketch some hopefully clear-cut comparisons among markets,
by means of an artiﬁcial and controllable agent-based environment.
The work in [Audet et al., 2001], [Bottazzi et al., 2005] and [Cliﬀ, 2003]
on the contrary, provide direct and explicit comparison of diﬀerent market
institutions. In the ﬁrst paper, quite sophisticated retail agents are com-
pared on two diﬀerent market platforms, namely a dealership and a limit
2However, an early paper suggesting to investigate the eﬀects of diﬀerent protocols
is [LeBaron, 2001]: “This can be both a curse and a blessing to market designers. On
the bad side it opens up another poorly understood set of design questions. However,
it may have the beneﬁcial eﬀect of allowing one to study the impact of diﬀerent trading
mechanisms”.
3order market3. The ﬁndings by Audet and coauthors are rich and depend
both on the features of the learning agents and the dealers, their risk aver-
sion, heterogeneity and number (that is a proxy of market depth). If the
utility of the ﬁnal welfare is used to assess the quality, then the dealership
market would be preferred in thin environments or by investors aﬀected by
large liquidity shocks, for example.
[Cliﬀ, 2003] oﬀers a novel way to compare diﬀerent markets. A contin-
uous space of auctions, including as special cases the usual double auction,
the English and the Dutch auctions, is explored in order to minimize Smith’s
α dispersion index by a genetic algorithm. The fresh idea is that agents,
equipped with some sort of machine learning capabilities, coevolve optimiz-
ing their own proﬁt together with the auction. Hence, the procedure really
ﬁnds at the same time the best type of agents suited for the most eﬃcient
market structure. This is interesting as it can be argued that agents would
most probably react to diﬀerent institutional architectures changing their
behaviour for self-interested purposes. As far as we know, no other papers
investigate the mutual adaptation of traders and market mechanisms.
The paper by [Bottazzi et al., 2005] is a careful comparison of three al-
ternative architectures and follows a line similar to our approach. In their
model, myopic, quadratic utility maximizing agents trade in diﬀerent set-
ups, namely a Walrasian auction, a batch auction and a ‘order-book’ mech-
anism. Ecologies of agents are shaped by the fraction of chartist traders,
extrapolating the future from past returns, that coexists with the remain-
ing part of purely noisy investors. As well known, the chartist traders can
destabilize the market and the deterministic skeleton of the dynamical sys-
tem describing the price shows a sequence of slowly exploding bubbles and
sudden crashes. The conclusion is that the properties of the time series “are
largely shaped by the speciﬁc architectures of trading mechanisms” and, to
a smaller extent, by the actual traders ecology. Quite diﬀerently, the alloca-
tive eﬃciency is more sensitive to behavioral parameters like the fraction of
market orders issued.
In our contribution, we simplify the way agents issue limit orders using
a reduced form that avoids the need to specify a full utility function and,
more importantly, to devise a necessarily arbitrary procedure to generate
some limit orders from it. Moreover, the standard dynamics of prices in
our model is homeostatic and does not intrinsically show regular bubbles
or crashes that are indeed to be ascribed to the behaviour of the agents
more than to the trading protocol. Our work diﬀers notably from all the
previous papers in that we model much simpler roundedly rational agents
and are interested in quantifying the impact of diﬀerent market types on
the macroscopic peculiarities of prices and returns generated by our agents,
3This is essentially identical to the batch auction presented in the following section and
is not to be confused with a continuous double auction.
4with the aim to compare price stability and execution quality.
The paper is organized as follows. In the Section 2 the model is described,
splitting the treatment of the (minimalist) behavioral features of the agents
from the description of the diﬀerent market mechanisms: batch auction,
CDA, competitive dealership. Section 3 gives some visual evidence that the
return time series are diverse and presents the results of the simulations. In
the ﬁrst part, that can be intended as a sort of executive summary, we run a
multidimensional scaling analysis to simply and graphically show the eﬀects
of distinct trading protocols. In the second part a more detailed analysis is
presented and discussed. Finally, we comment our ﬁndings and draw some
conclusions.
2 The model
The structural assumptions follow [LiCalzi and Pellizzari, 2003]. The econ-
omy we consider has two assets, one bond, paying a riskless yearly interest
rate r, and one stock. The total amount of stock and cash in the economy is
constant4 because we assume that the interest earned on the bond is spent
elsewhere or consumed. However, since the number of active traders may
vary over time, the quantities of cash and stock available on the market are
not constant. Furthermore, we assume that no new information is ever re-
leased. Therefore, except for the number of active traders, the fundamentals
of the economy are essentially unchanged over time.
In the following, a detailed description of the artiﬁcial agents and the
markets where they participate is given.
2.1 The agents
We consider N heterogeneous traders who enter or exit the market inde-
pendently from each other. They either buy or sell stock in exchange for
cash. Short selling or borrowing money are not allowed. Thus, traders are
budget constrained both on the buy and the sell side: they can place buy
orders only if they have suﬃcient cash and sell orders only for the stock they
possess. Traders’ strategies rely on two basic assumptions. First, traders
want to buy at low price and sell at high price; second, they estimate the
fundamental value v of the stock and this is never revised during the activity
period.
When active, trader i is endowed with si units of stock and a quantity ci
of cash. Each agent has an investing horizon hi and expects that the risky
asset value will reach the fundamental value vi (s)he estimates by the time
4The dealership is an exception as a small cash quantity is gained by the dealer for
each round-trip transaction. Hence the cash in the market is very slowly decreasing in
this market.
5t + hi. Traders wish to maximize their gains over the remaining time span
hi−t, which is their activity period. At time t a risk neutral agent buys the
stock at price p only if
v
p
≥ (1 + r)(hi−t). (1)
More generally, agents are risk-averse. Since the bond has a riskless yearly
rate of return r while investment in the stock is risky, we model the risk-
return trade-oﬀ incorporating both a positive yearly risk premium πB
i to
buy and a positive yearly risk premium πS
i to sell in (1). Hence, traders
will buy stock at time t if they expect a return suﬃciently higher than the









Consequently, we obtain the highest bid price βi that an agent is willing to




1 + r + πB
i
￿(hi−t). (3)
Similarly, the smallest ask price αi (s)he is willing to oﬀer at time t is
αi (t) =
vi
(1 + r + πS
i )(hi−t). (4)
In order to ensure that βi(t) ≤ αi(t) we set πB
i ≥ πS
i for any i. Hence, if
active, agents submit orders as couples (Qi,Pi), where Qi is the quantity
they are willing to buy/sell and Pi is the relative limit price. We assume
that Qi is strictly positive (negative) for a buy (sell) order. Whenever agents
can trade they randomly decide with equal probability if their orders are on
the buy or sell side.
When agents enter the market at time ¯ t, αi (t) and βi (t) are increasing
functions deﬁned in [¯ t,hi]. During this activity period and subject to the
budget constraints, agents buy stock if the current price p is smaller than
βi (t) or sell if it is greater than αi (t), and hold their position in between.
Since the diﬀerence between bid and ask price decreases in the residual time
(hi − t), agents are likely to trade more actively towards the end of their
activity period, providing liquidity to the market. Notice that the bond
provides only the riskless rate of interest r used in the deﬁnition of αi (t)
and βi (t), and plays no other role. When t = hi agents have reached their
investment horizon and exit the market keeping their current endowment.
These endowments are transferred to new traders entering the market some
time later, with new investment horizons and new estimates for the funda-
mental value of the stock. Therefore, since investment horizons are randomly
distributed across agents, a staggered entry of new traders occurs but the
total amount of cash and stock is constant (this is only approximately true
6for the dealership, see Section 2.2.3). The time elapsed between the exit of
an agent and the subsequent entry of a new trader is a random variable τ.
Operationally, when i-th agent exits at hi, we sample a random τi and let
a new agent enter at time hi + τi, with the same cash and stock but newly
and independently sampled horizon and fundamental value.
2.2 Market architectures
In this section we describe three market architectures to compare how the
price time series generated by the previously described agents are aﬀected
by institutional features. The three market protocols we take into account
are thus a Batch Auction (BA), a Continuous Double Auction (CDA) and
a Dealer market or dealership (DEA) whose descriptions are given below.
Some features are common to all trading protocols. Trading is organized
in sessions (days), in which all active agents submit bids or asks in random
order. For concreteness, limit prices are discretized taking the ceiling (ﬂoor)
of α(t) (β(t)), the minimum tick is ∆ = 1 and all unfulﬁlled orders are
canceled at the end of the trading day. Hence, each day is beginning with no
outstanding orders and if an agent was not able to trade, he must resubmit
his/her limit orders.
2.2.1 Batch auction
In a Batch Auction agents can submit limit orders (Qi,Pi), where Qi is
the desired quantity and Pi is the maximum (minimum) price the agent is
willing to pay (receive) to buy (sell) one unit of stock. Once all agents with
adequate endowments have submitted limit buy and sell orders, a unique
clearing price is selected in order to maximize the total quantity of exchanged








The clearing price pt, if it exists, is to be chosen in the set
P = argmax
p min{D(p),S(p)}.
If min{D(p),S(p)} = 0,∀p ∈ P, then no trading takes place, as the
biggest bid is smaller than the smallest ask. We then set for convenience
pt = pt−1 and there is no exchange of cash and assets.
If on the other hand, min{D(p),S(p)} > 0,∀p ∈ P, we must select one
element in P. A common solution in this case is the κ-auction that sets
pt = κinf P +(1−κ)supP. Observe that prices being quoted discretely, we
use the a slightly modiﬁed version and compute
pt = ⌊κminP + (1 − κ)maxP⌋,
7where ⌊x⌋ is the biggest integer not larger than x. Orders of agents that
have submitted adequate bids (with Pi ≥ pt) and asks (with Pi ≤ pt) are
then satisﬁed, possibly with rationing, and cash and stock endowments are
accordingly updated.
2.2.2 Continuous Double Auction
The second market model is a Continuous Double Auction (CDA). The
agent can submit limit sell or buy orders that are stored in two diﬀerent
books if they cannot ﬁnd an immediate execution. When an agent issues a
buy order, the book containing yet unmatched asks is scanned. If the best
ask in the book is smaller than the agent’s bid the execution price is the
ask in the book and the exchanged quantity is the smallest between the two
orders. This procedure is then repeated until the incoming order is fully
executed or no compatible ask is found. In this case, the unmatched part of
the incoming order in stored for future use in the bid book, with the usual
price-quantity-time priority. The same, mutatis mutandis, happens when a
limit sell order is submitted to the market.
This procedure mimics the following behavior by an agent willing to
issue an order at a certain price: he ﬁrst checks the appropriate book for a
compatible price, exchange units at this price if possible and then submit
a limit order for the quantity that was not exchanged, if needed. While all
units are traded for the same price in a BA, in a CDA diﬀerent prices can
be observed in a single trading day (and even in the execution of the same
order).
2.2.3 Dealer market
The third market model we consider is a Dealership Market (DEA). Any
agent willing to trade must do it through the intermediation of a dealer that
quotes the price at which it will buy and sell. In this market the dealer
supplies all the liquidity. The agent willing to buy (sell) at price Pi checks
for the smaller ask (higher bid) provided by the dealer. If this is the case, all
the units are exchanged at the dealer’s quote; else the agent’s order remains
unfulﬁlled. After a successful trade, the dealer adjusts immediately his bid
and ask prices mechanically increasing (decreasing) both quotes by the same
unitary amount if he sold (bought) the risky asset. This is a rough device to
keep the inventory under control, encouraging other traders to take deals on
the other side. The bid-ask spread Γ oﬀered by the dealer is then constant
and ﬁxed at the beginning of the simulation experiment. The bid-ask spread
is the unique distinctive parameter of the dealer and is clearly related to the
liquidity of the market. Some reﬂection shows that the dealer is continuosly
extracting some cash from the market as a round trip trade produce a gain of
Γ−1, at the expense of the agents. Hence, this is the only market where the
8total amount of cash available to traders is (slowly but) steadily decreasing
with time. Moreover, observe that our dealer is completely mechanical and
has no strategic behavior. As in the other markets, the role of the dealer
could be accomplished by a program as no intelligence or expertise is needed
to implement his duties. The quotes available at the closure of one trading
day are kept and used to open the following day.
3 Simulation results
Our simulations are not meant to replicate the price dynamics observed in
real markets, but to compare the performance of the three diﬀerent mech-
anisms we considered. For all the three architectures a trading session is
thought, for convenience, as one day. It is then handy to speak of years of
250 trading days. We collect price dynamics statistics replicating 25 times
each market for 2500 trading days. To avoid transient eﬀects, we discard
systematically the ﬁrst 500 prices to compute returns. Therefore, we are
left with summary statistics for 75 time series of 2000 observations each,
corresponding to 8 years of trading data.
We take into account the multidimensional nature of market execution
quality collecting data about a set of features possibly occurring with dif-
ferent market architectures. Aiming to discuss price stability and related
indicators, see the Introduction, we focused on volatility (standard devia-
tion), excess kurtosis and tail exponent of logarithmic returns. When mul-
tiple prices are observed in one trading sessions (CDA and DEA), we use as
reference price the average the over the whole day. We also report volume
of trades, a measure of perceived gain by the agents and the average bid-ask
spread prevailing in the second half of the trading day. A more detailed
description of these six measures is deferred to subsection 3.3.
In order to get a more meaningful comparison of the various markets, the
simulations are run using the same random seed across diﬀerent protocols.
This means that the very same random sequence of buy/sell order is used
by the agents submitting orders to diﬀerent market mechanisms.
The material of this Section is presented in three subsections. The ﬁrst
one is showing the parameters used in the simulation. The second one is
meant to be a brief and compact account of the main results, with emphasis
on the overall diversity of price dynamics in diﬀerent market frameworks.
This subsection can be regarded as a sort of executive summary that en-
hances the most evident facts, postponing a more thorough discussion to
the third part that contains a detailed analysis of each statistical indicator.
3.1 The parameters
We used in the simulation the parameter values listed in Table 1. Global
parameters are: the number N of potentially active agents in a trading
9session; the riskless interest rate r, assumed constant over time; the initial
stock price p0. All traders are endowed with cash ci and stock si. They
are moreover characterized by their estimate of the fundamental value vi of
the risky asset, a premium to buy πB
i and a premium to sell πS
i , and their
activity period hi. Traders that exit the market are then replaced after a
period τi by ‘new’ traders that inherit their cash and stocks. The dealer5 is
described by his bid-ask spread Γ (and by the initial quotes that have very






Trader ci 2000 (ﬁrst activation only)
si 1 (ﬁrst activation only)
vi ∼ U [900,1100]
πB




hi ∼ t + ⌈exp(1/250)⌉ days
τi ∼ hi + ⌈exp(1/250)⌉ days
Table 1: Parameters used in the simulations.
U and exp denote respectively the uniform and the exponential distri-
bution, while ‘∼’ denotes an independent draw from a probability distri-
bution. Global parameters and dealer’s Γ are set once and for all at time
t = 0. Traders’ initial endowments ci and si are set at the ﬁrst activation
(and then inherited). The other traders’ individual parameters are reset at
each time traders are activated. While active traders have initially the same
endowment of cash and stock, after replacing exiting agents they may later
have diﬀerent endowments. The yearly rate of return r = 0.02 we chose is
close to the current rate of inﬂation in the Euro zone, a reasonable lower
bound for the nominal riskless rate of return. About the risk premium to
sell, since bid prices must be smaller than ask prices we must have πB
i < πS
i






. In particular, to
simplify things and reduce the number of parameters, for our simulations
we set πS
i = πB
i /2 for all i = 1,...,N.
5We have investigated markets with multiple dealers in a previous version of this paper.
The main eﬀect of the presence of many dealers is the reduction of the eﬀective bid-ask
spread. However, as this eﬀect can be proxied by decreasing Γ with a unique dealer and
the results are qualitatively the same, we describe the simplest situation here.
103.2 Executive summary
The summary statistics are reported in Table 2 where the averages over 25
passes (of 2000 trading days) are shown for each market, with estimated
standard deviations in brackets. The columns contain the volatility, excess
kurtosis and tail exponent of returns, average volume, perceived gain and
bid-ask spread of quotes.
Vol EKurt TExp Volume PercG Spread
Batch
3.00% 1.00 -7.62 5.51 174.34 -
(0.063%) (0.39) (1.96) (0.07) (2.87) -
CDA
0.53% 39.36 -2.60 8.19 372.38 3.49
(0.054%) (26.94) (0.54) (0.12) (5.82) (0.08)
Dealership
0.24% 0.067 - 5.28 376.43 [4.00]
(0.005%) (0.10) - (0.08) (6.86) -
Table 2: Averaged statistics (25 simulations) for each market, based on 2000
daily returns, standard deviation in brackets. The columns show volatility,
kurtosis, tail exponent α, volume, perceived gain and bid-ask spread in
the second half of the trading day. See a more detailed description in the
following subsection.
The ﬁrst three columns are directly related to variants of price stability.
While volatility is a common measure of dispersion, the kurtosis is more
sensitive to local shocks and the tail exponent is a possible assessment of
returns riskiness. The fourth and sixth columns contain other widely used
indicators about depth and liquidity of the market. The ﬁfth column is
measuring the absolute accumulated diﬀerence of execution and limit prices
and can be regarded as the perceived gain by the agent. The comparison
of the three markets (BA, CDA and dealership) shows the following main
features:
1. The batch auction produces very volatile returns coupled with low
kurtosis and fast tail decay (i.e. extreme returns are rare). The volume
ranks in between the CDA and the dealership and the agents perceive
a low gain from BA markets;
2. The CDA market has low volatility (one order of magnitude less than
the BA) but frequent extreme events. Moreover, very slow tail de-
cay makes it a risky environment. The market generates the biggest
amount of trades and is liquid due to the low bid-ask spread. Agents
perceive high gain when trading (statistically equal to the one per-
ceived in a dealership);
113. The dealership return dynamics is the least volatile, with insigniﬁcant
kurtosis (no extreme events) and exponentially fast tail decay. The
volume of trades is low but the overall perceived gain is high (it is the
biggest on a per-share basis). The bid-ask spread was ﬁxed at 4 to be
somehow close to a CDA.
Volatility
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Figure 1: Pairwise statistics for BA (black), CDA (red), DEA (green) mar-
kets.
The four statistics common to all the markets are depicted pairwise in
Figure 1. It can be noted that markets, in diﬀerent colors, can be clearly
severalized by joint observation of diﬀerent indicators.
To stress the fact that diﬀerent market architectures produce markedly
dissimilar price dynamics, we process our data (75 vectors in R4, omitting
the tail exponent and spread that are not always deﬁned) in order to re-
duce their dimensionality to ease graphical comparison. Multidimensional
scaling is a well-known technique used to preserve as much as possible the
distances between the original datapoints in a lower dimensional subspace,
see [Cox and Cox, 2000] for a full account. Figure 2 shows a planar rep-
resentation of our simulations where distinct clusters are corresponding to
the three markets under scrutiny. We used Principal Coordinate Analysis
(PCoA), as described in [Edwards and Oman, 2003]. This graph, where the
diﬀerent markets can be clearly distinguished, reinforces the issue that insti-
tutional architectures really matter in shaping the multidimensional nature















Figure 2: Multidimensional scaling of simulation data. The planar distance
of points in the graph is approximately the same as in the full 4-dim space
of statistics: BA (black), CDA (red), dealership (green).
of execution quality and price stability. It also suggests that most (but not
all) realizations of a CDA might produce price dynamics closer to a dealer-
ship rather than to a batch market. A very similar pictorial result can be
obtained by a standard Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as well.
3.3 A detailed analysis
We give in this section a more complete description of our simulation results.
Where meaningful, we computed for each experiment the following 6 relevant
statistics of returns or indicators.
Volatility. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the returns.
Excess kurtosis. It describes the peakedness and tails of a distribution with
respect to a normal distribution (that has null excess kurtosis). It is
computed as E[(R−µR)4]/σ4
R −3, where R is the random return and
µR,σR denote mean and standard deviation.
Tail exponent. Assuming the cumulative distribution functions of returns
is F(x) ∼ 1−xα, the exponent provides a widely used measure of the
speed of tail decay.
13Volume. The cumulated number of transactions occurred in every trading
day is collected.
Perceived gain. For each trading day, it is the cumulated excess gain,
computed as the quantity traded times the absolute diﬀerence of the
limit price order Pj submitted by an agent and the price pj actually





where the sum is over the set of transactions Et of day t and qj denotes
the actual number of traded stocks. Observe that pj might vary in a
single day and even in the execution of a single order in the case of
the CDA. The greater PG, the higher is the perception by trader to
have made good bargains.
Bid-ask spread. The diﬀerence between the best ask and the best bid is a
very common measure of liquidity in the book-based or quote-driven
markets. Clearly, the best ask and bid are simply the dealer’s quotes
in a dealership. In a CDA, some caution is needed as the spread might
be very large at the beginning of a trading day, due to the temporary
lack of orders recorded in the book. Hence, we compute, for each day,
the average bid-ask spread in the second half of the trader session,
when the books contain many orders.
Whenever needed, the estimates of the fundamental value v are uniformly
distributed around 1000 with an oﬀset of ±10%. The risk premium to buy
πB
i is in the range from 0 to 3 times the rate of interest, in order to span a
large set of attitudes to risk. As mentioned above, we set πS
i = πB
i /2.
Entries and exits from the markets follow independent Poisson processes.
Both activity and inactivity periods are exponentially distributed with pa-
rameter 250, that is, the expected agents’ lifetime is 1 year. The entry-exit
process is stationary and the number of active traders is constant on aver-
age. Notice that, since time is discrete, the values of the investment horizon
hi and the inactivity period τi are truncated to be integers. The same holds
for the limit price αi(t) and βi(t), due to the discrete nature of ticked prices.
We show, in Figure 3, representative time series of the trading price
in one simulation for each of the three mechanisms. Some diﬀerences are
immediately visible.
A glance at the price time series shows that the CDA returns are lep-
tokurtic. The small number of isolated shocks in the BA well explains the
extremely thin tails of its returns distribution, while their complete absence
in the DEA makes this protocol rather peculiar. In fact, the support of
the returns distribution in the dealership is a moving compact interval of


























































Figure 3: Time prices series of a) Batch Auction (BA), b) Continuous Double
Auction (CDA), c) Dealer market (DEA).
lenght Γ that moves around the mean value. This nicely agrees with the
exponentially fast decay of the tails.
Shocks on prices also aﬀect volatility of the returns of the three protocols,
as shown in a comparison in Figure 4. The BA shows an average standard
deviation of 3%, while for both the CDA and DEA market the values are
much smaller, about 0.5% and 0.2%, respectively. This is evident as well
from the price series presented in Figure 3.
When comparing the excess kurtosis in the distributions of returns one
observes that it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero under the DEA and
moderate in a BA, with average values respectively equal to 0.067 and 1.00.
In the CDA the empirical excess kurtosis has a huge average value of 39.36
(see Figure 5). This is not very surprising since the CDA tipically exhibits
many big isolated shocks in the price time series.
The tail exponent α is one way to quantify the relevance of extreme
events. It is not estimated for the DEA whose returns have nearly com-
pact support. The exponent of the BA distribution is about −7.62, pointing
to very fast tail decay, while the exponent of the CDA is −2.63, signalling
quite fat tails. Similar values for the tail exponent imply that the theoreti-
cal excess kurtosis is inﬁnite, thus explaining huge values for the empirical










































Figure 4: Comparison of volatilities of returns for BA (black), CDA (red),
DEA (green) markets.






























Figure 5: Excess kurtosis comparison for BA (black), CDA (red), DEA
(green) markets.
























Figure 6: Comparison of the perceived gain in BA (black), CDA (red), DEA
(green) markets.
estimate in the CDA.
The volume in BA and DEA are quite close, 5.51 and 5.28, respectively.
The CDA average number of transactions (8.19) is notably bigger, consis-
tently with the observation of excessive volume often found in the literature.
We note that a lighter volume in the DEA might be justiﬁed by the reduction
of wealth cashed by thee dealer for every round trip transaction. Moreover,
to avoid counting twice the same traded unit in a DEA (from one agent
to the dealer and then from the dealer to another agent), we compute the
volume halving the sum of units bought and sold by the specialist.
In real world, book based and dealership are the most commonly used
market and several authors addressed the question why continuous trading
is needed. A measure of perceived gain might help to understand this as-
pect. In fact, from the traders’ point of view diﬀerent trading protocols and,
consequently, diﬀerent available prices, might lead to a subjectively diﬀer-
ent perception of gain. As we can see in Figure 6, CDA and DEA have a
comparable perceived gain, which is more than doubling the value in a BA.
Hence, our results might give one reason why CDA and DEA markets are
preferred. At the end of this discussion we will come back to this issue to
add more.
In the order-book market, the bid-ask spread (in the second part of the
day) is smaller than that observed in case of dealer market. In fact, the CDA
17shows an average spread of about 3.50, to be contrasted with the constant
spread (4) that was ﬁxed in the dealership market.
Table 3 reports the ratio between the perceived gain and the volume
of transactions. The dealership strikingly emerges in this evaluation with
a ratio value much bigger than that of the CDA and almost twice as that
of the BA. This implies that, between the order-book and the dealership





Table 3: Ratio between the perceived gain and the volume for the three
protocols.
Finally, in stable markets as ours, high volume means high liquidity and
hence, low volatility. The matter is diﬀerent in real markets where explosive
volumes are coupled with new information arrival, high uncertainty, strong
price movements and high volatility. In summary, the relation we ﬁnd is
reasonable in a calm and stable situation and this does not contrast with
the usual claim that high volume is coming with volatility spikes that are
appropriate for nervous markets.
4 Conclusion
We have studied three market protocols with respect to “price stability”,
studying some relevant indicators like volatility, excess kurtosis and tail
exponent of returns, volume, perceived gain and bid-ask spread. Computa-
tional experiments are run in a clean agent-based environment that controls
for unwanted allocative or informational eﬀects. The markets rank diﬀer-
ently depending on the speciﬁc performance measure, thus revealing the
multidimensional nature of market execution quality. The BA generates the
smallest volume but the biggest dispersion in returns, the CDA is a liquid
market with rather low standard deviation but has huge excess kurtosis. If
one agrees that a regulatory agency might pursue stable, non-volatile, liquid
markets with little excess volume and infrequent large shocks then standard
deviation, kurtosis, bid-ask spread and tail exponent of price returns should
be low. Volume is a more controversial measure, though there might the
general sentiment of too abundant transactions in ﬁnancial markets. In the
framework just sketched, the dealership protocol compare rather favorably
to other architectures for various reasons. The volatility is low, virtually no
excess kurtosis is present, ultra-fast tail decay is observed and the volume
is lower than in a BA (but is clearly dependent on the choice of the spread
18Γ). As an added bonus, agents might perceive high gains from trading in
this market, both in absolute terms and on a per-transaction basis. We
may argue that a dealership accommodates the total centralization of a BA
with the freedom allowed in a CDA, providing a sort of mediation of two
extremes that result in good overall performance. However, this is coming
with some cost unique to this market. The dealership functioning is indeed
slightly reducing the wealth of the agents as the dealer is cashing a spread
on each round-trip transaction, even in the absence of any other transaction
fee (that might be present in other mechanisms as well). Summing up, the
mild rationality oﬀered by a dealership allows to avoid severe pathologies in
price dynamics and, in our view, has few drawbacks and reasonable cost.
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